We address three research questions motivated by the recent ascent of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe. First, analyzing the determinants of voluntary IFRS adoption by publicly traded German firms during the period 1998-2004, we find that size, international exposure, dispersion of ownership, and recent IPOs are important drivers. Second, using the results from this determinant model to construct propensity score-matched samples of IFRS and German-GAAP (HGB) firms, we document significant differences in terms of earnings quality: IFRS firms have more persistent, less predictable and more conditionally conservative earnings. Third, analyzing information asymmetry differences between IFRS and HGB firms, we show that IFRS adopters experience a decline in bid-ask spread of 70 base points and an average of 17 more days with price changes per year. On the other hand, IFRS adopter's stock prices seem to be more volatile. In the light of some important limitations of our study, we discuss IFRS-related research opportunities in post-2005 Europe.
Introduction
The European Commission's 'IAS Regulation' (EC 2002) 'global players' adopted internationally accepted accounting systems, i.e. IFRS and U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP), as early as 1993. 2 Since these firms were required to continue reporting under national GAAP, costly 'parallel' and 'dual' accounting resulted. 3 In response to the ensuing 'demand pull' for international accounting, the 1998 Capital Raising Facilitation Act (Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz-KapAEG) allowed publicly traded parent companies to substitute consolidated
IFRS or U.S. GAAP accounts for HGB (Handelsgesetzbuch -German Commercial
Code, the main source of German GAAP) group accounts. 4 Six other European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, and Luxemburg) introduced similar legislation. 5 In Germany, IFRS or U.S. GAAP were required of firms listed in the now-defunct Considering the European Commission's goals in introducing the IAS Regulation, three broad research questions arise: First, does adoption of IFRS rules ensure "a high level of transparency and comparability"? If so, assessing the extent to which 'highquality', comparable financial reporting contributes to "the efficient and cost-effective functioning of the capital market" begets two further questions: Second, how does financial reporting quality influence information asymmetry? And third, how does information asymmetry relate to stock prices, e.g. to the firms' cost of equity capital?
With respect to the first question, research is required that assesses the 'quality' of financial reporting outcomes under IFRS and its determinants. Financial reporting quality is an elusive concept. Since accounting serves different purposes, it seems futile to attempt a comprehensive definition of financial reporting quality. Besides serving as a contracting device, the function of financial reporting is to reduce information asymmetries between market participants. Therefore, most of the academic accounting literature adopts a decision-usefulness perspective to financial reporting quality, 6 which is consis-6 In this paper, we follow prior literature in focusing on the decision-usefulness role of financial reporting. This does not imply, however, that we view its contracting role as less important. See Watts (2006) for a recent discussion of this topic. The theoretical concept of economic income is an alternative, neutral benchmark against which to assess the outcomes of a given financial reporting system (e.g., Beaver, 1998, p. 3) . However, due to its lack of operationality and observability (Schipper/Vincent, 2003) , it cannot be used in empirical research, but is rather employed as a frame of reference in prescriptive-normative accounting research.
tent with the IASB's and FASB's stated objectives of financial reporting standards. 7 This paper addresses the connection between accounting standards and the quality of accounting outcomes. According to the SEC, there is a strong link between high-quality standards and high-quality accounting outcomes: The standards must be of "high qualitythey must result in comparability and transparency, and they must provide for full disclosure. Investors must be able to meaningfully analyze performance across time periods and among companies" (Levitt 1998, p. 81) . 8 On the other hand, quality -as well as other financial reporting properties 9 -may not be determined solely by the financial reporting standards followed. Rather, since standards provide discretion, financial reporting quality is also shaped by the incentives of those preparing (and auditing) the financial information. 10 Consequently, the relative role of standards versus incentives in determining financial reporting properties, including quality, is one of the most fundamental questions in accounting research.
Second, financial reporting quality, especially the quality and quantity of disclosure (e.g., Leuz/Verrecchia, 2000) , is expected to be negatively associated with information asymmetry. To the extent that IFRS reporting increases financial reporting quality, (Levitt, 1998, p. 81) . 8 Pownall/Schipper (1998) review earlier research related to the SEC's consideration of IFRS and to these three criteria.
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While we view comparability as another important financial reporting property, we do not further address it in this paper. We do, however, discuss in section 4 research opportunities for addressing the comparability dimension of IFRS reporting. et al. (2005) show associations between different proxies for information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital.
In this paper we condense and extend prior findings regarding the effect of IFRS on the German market by addressing the first two questions presented above. Despite the popular notion that "high quality standards lower the cost of capital" (Levitt, 1998, p. 82) , 11 we do not analyze the effects of IFRS adoption, an accounting phenomenon, on the cost of capital, an asset pricing phenomenon, since we believe that this relation is not yet well understood (e.g., Ewert, 1999). When linking financial reporting quality to the cost of capital, we view the cost of capital as a second-order effect, following information asymmetry, the first-order effect. Rather, we initially estimate a determinant model of the IFRS adoption decision for German firms which voluntarily adopted IFRS over the period 1998 to 2004. Using the results from this model, we construct a propensity scorematched sample of control firms in order to address the problem of self-selection bias.
We then compare selected earnings attributes of these two samples over time in order to test whether the change to IFRS altered the quality of the financial reporting information.
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A survey conducted by Pellens/Tomaszewski (1999, p. 203) 
Earnings quality
In order to assess whether different accounting standards lead to differences in financial reporting quality, a definition of financial reporting quality is required. In line with prior literature, we focus on the narrower concept of earnings quality, since earnings is a summary measure on which many users of financial reporting information rely. vance is difficult to interpret because the measure does not support conclusions about causality. Also, value relevance relies on market data, which makes this metric susceptible to differences in market efficiency.
Given our suggested operationalization of earnings quality: Why would we expect earnings quality to differ between IFRS and HGB firms? Since earnings quality is a function of accounting standards, institutional environment and incentives, we first have to assume that, ceteris paribus, accounting standards quality has an impact on earnings quality. Although we believe accounting standards quality to be unobservable (since there is no objective, interpersonal rule to judge the quality of standards with), we propose three different reasons for quality differences between IFRS and German GAAP: (1) the fundamental character of the standards, (2) the objectives of the standards, and (3) the standard-setting process. First, since the German HGB is more strongly principles-based than IFRS, and since empirical results seem to indicate that principles-based standards produce better earnings quality (e.g. Webster/Thornton, 2005), we posit the assumption that HGB standards result in higher earnings quality. Second, although consolidated financial statements under both IFRS and German GAAP are geared exclusively towards decision usefulness (e.g., Leuz, 2003, p. 453 ; § 297 HGB), German-GAAP group accounts are usually derived from individual accounts, which in Germany are the basis for taxation and legal dividend restrictions. Since the prudence principle is dominant in German accounting rules ( § 252 HGB), German GAAP group accounts might in some cases reflect prudent accounting to the extent that the consolidation process did not revoke prudent recognition and measurement policies (e.g., Sellhorn/Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006 ).
This coexistence of multiple purposes in German GAAP can be argued to decrease earnings quality relative to the single-purpose IFRS. Third, German GAAP are established in the public-sector political-legal system, while IFRS are promulgated by a private-sector standard-setting body. It has been argued that procedural properties of the rule-making process influence the unobservable quality of the resulting rules and, thus, earnings quality (e.g., Pellens/Fülbier/Gassen, 2006, pp. 24-28) . To the extent that the IASB's due process is superior to the German legislative procedure in terms of equal involvement of all stakeholders, neutrality of the standard-setting body, presence of a measurable objective derived from an agreed-upon, consistent conceptual framework, and monitoring and enforcement of the principles of fair standard-setting by an independent authority, IFRS can be expected to be higher-quality than German GAAP. 
Information asymmetry
Theory suggests that higher financial reporting quality reduces the dispersion of information (1) between managers and outside investors and (2) between potential buyers and sellers of shares (e.g., Leuz/Verrecchia, 2000 While Leuz/Verrecchia (2000, p. 92 ) actually refer to "the notion of 'increased levels of disclosure' to be interpreted as either an increase in the quantity of disclosure or an increase in the quality of disclosure (or both)", we argue that an increase in earnings quality should have qualitatively the same effect.
Whether or not this relation holds in practice is an empirical question (e.g., Ewert, 1999). Consistent with the notion that information asymmetry differences are a first-order effect of differences in financial reporting, Leuz (2003) exploits a unique setting that presented itself at the German 'Neuer Markt'. Comparing information asymmetry measures between two otherwise homogeneous sets of firms reporting under either IFRS or U.S.
GAAP, he shows that differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP firms in terms of bidask spread, share turnover and other information asymmetry proxies are statistically insignificant and economically small. Examining the effects of voluntary non-local GAAP adoption by EU firms, Cuijpers/Buijink (2005) fail to find significant benefits in terms of the cost of equity capital and stock return volatility. However, they document a positive effect of non-local GAAP adoption on analyst following. Results for analyst forecast dispersion differ between 'early' and 'late' adopters.
Evidence on the determinants and consequences of IFRS adoption
In this section, we provide year-specific evidence for German firms in the period 1998-2004 on the determinants of IFRS adoption, on the differences in earnings quality between IFRS and German GAAP reports, and on the effects of IFRS versus HGB reporting on information asymmetry.
Sample selection and determinants of IFRS adoption
In order to assess the extent and impact of IFRS adoption, we use various sources to obtain time-series information on the accounting standards followed by German public to otherwise obtain data, we rely on the Worldscope item "Accounting Standards Followed".
[Insert Table 1 around here] Table 1 shows the distribution of the application of HGB, IFRS and U.S. GAAP over time. We code dual accounting as HGB accounting, because in this case, compliance with IFRS is limited by conflicting HGB requirements. In line with prior research, we document a monotonic incline of IFRS application over time, with rapid growth around the enactment of the KapAEG. The number of U.S. GAAP adopters also increases during the 1990s, but later decreases as the IAS Regulation was discussed and finally adopted.
For our further analysis, we focus on the period 1998-2004. In 1998, publicly traded German corporations were allowed to substitute IFRS consolidated financial statements for group accounts prepared under German GAAP for the first time. Previously, firms were forced to incur the costs of dual or parallel reporting, which implies that 'early' and 'late' (with respect to the year 1998) adopters differ systematically. In addition, IFRS sample sizes in the years prior to 1998 are too small for the annual regressions we con- non-truncated variables are winsorized at the bottom and top percentiles. Since we analyze IFRS adoption, we eliminate all U.S. GAAP firms. We also exclude financial institutions because of the fundamental differences in their financial accounting relative to nonfinancial firms. We further limit our sample to observations for which sufficient data is available to carry out all of our analyses. These cuts substantially reduce our sample size compared to the numbers in Table 1 and bias our sample towards the larger and more 'visible' firms on which the international accounting debate concentrates. The resulting sample size and properties are reported in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 around here]
The descriptive statistics in Panel A and B reveal substantial differences between IFRS firms and HGB firms: Not only do fewer IFRS firms operate in the manufacturing sector; they are also larger, have a higher proportion of foreign sales, have more diverse ownership structures, are listed on more stock exchanges, have a higher propensity of being listed on the U.S. capital market, and more frequently went public in 1995 or later.
Since our sample firms self-select into applying IFRS, they can be expected to be systematically different from other firms which do not choose to voluntarily comply with IFRS. To address the resulting selection bias (see also Leuz, 2003; Leuz/Verrecchia, 2000) , we apply a propensity-score matching procedure, which can be viewed as a similar but alternative approach to the two-stage Heckman procedure applied by prior literature. The propensity-score matching technique is a well-accepted matching methodology in the natural and social sciences. Refer to Rosenbaum/Rubin (1983) for the seminal paper and to Smith/Todd (2001) for a discussion of the methodological and conceptual differences between the propensity score matching technique and the two-stage Heckman approach.
We construct propensity score-matched samples of firms that do and do not adopt IFRS, respectively, for each year of the sample period: Each IFRS firm is matched by a HGB firm which, according to the results of estimating determinant model (1) in Panel C of Table 2 , has the same propensity to adopt IFRS but chose not to. In order to include only close matches in our sample, we impose a caliper of 0.1, meaning that the differences in propensity scores between matched IFRS and HGB firms are below 10%. Using this technique, we ensure that differences in the subsequent analyses are not caused by differences underlying the decision to voluntarily adopt IFRS. The matching procedure thus controls for relevant sample differences other than the accounting standards followed, allowing for a test of the relative role of rules versus incentives in determining financial reporting outcomes. In effect, we construct our treatment (IFRS firms) and control samples (HGB firms) so that, conceptually, we can expect the matched firms to differ only in terms of the accounting standards followed and of the effects of this difference.
Since this matching technique depends crucially on our determinant model capturing all aspects of the voluntary IFRS adoption by German firms, we rely on the results of prior research (presented in section 2) for constructing model (1). 19 The results of the annual estimations complement the results of prior research: Younger, larger U.S-listed firms with a larger proportion of foreign sales and more dispersed ownership tend to have a higher propensity of adopting IFRS.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
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We apply a set of robustness tests to ensure our model captures the IFRS decision: We include more industry intercepts, different measures of financing needs or liquidity constraints, and alternative measures of capital market access. We find our results to be stable. The alternative specifications of model (1) do not qualitatively influence our subsequent results.
The propensity score-matched sample constructed based on the estimates of model (1) is presented in Table 3 . Panel A reports the distribution of our sample across time and accounting standards followed. Carrying out our matching procedure separately for each year ensures that for each year every treatment (IFRS) firm is matched by a control (HGB) firm of the same year. It is important to note that the resulting samples are no longer representative of all HGB and IFRS firms. Comparing the average market capitalizations of the matched HGB sample in Table 3 to the original HGB sample in Table 2 we find that the former firms are on average (median) roughly 50% larger than the latter. In contrast, the firms in the propensity score-matched IFRS sample are smaller on average than the original IFRS sample firms in Table 2 . 20 Thus, we can draw only relative, not absolute inferences from the analyses conducted in the following sections. Panel B and C of Table 3 compare the two propensity score-matched samples along the variables required for the analyses in section 3.2. Generally, there are few differences across the two samples. Interestingly, however, the only significant difference -IFRS firms report lower earnings than comparable HGB firms -is a direct result of the accounting system followed.
Earnings quality effects of IFRS adoption
In defining our measures of earnings quality, we rely on prior literature. Mainly To verify the effectiveness of the propensity score-matching technique, we retest the propensity scorematched sample with regard to the univariate variable differences documented in Panel B of Table 2 and find them to be insignificant (not tabulated). Table   4 along with the other earnings attributes. The results for our measure of accrual quality, the absolute of the residual of model (2) deflated by its dependent variable, 22 are higher for IFRS, indicating that the accrual quality of IFRS firms is lower than that of comparable HGB firms. However, the differences are insignificant (two-sided significance for mean: 0.445; median: 0.201).
[Insert (5)). The results are reported in Panel D. The 'good news' coefficient (β 2 ) is lower for IFRS firms and the 'bad news' coefficient (β 3 ) is higher, indicating that IFRS firms exhibit more conditionally conservative earnings than HGB firms. Panel E reports the differences (β 3 -β 2 ) for the two samples.
We assess the significance of the difference in this metric between the two samples by estimating a fully interacted version of model (6) for the pooled sample (not tabulated).
The significance is estimated by an F-Test, which tests whether the difference of the interacted versions of β 3 and β 2 is above zero. We find the difference to be significant, but only marginally so (two-sided significance: 0.097). has had a positive impact on the earnings quality of German firms. The next section investigates whether this earnings quality improvement has also had an impact on the information asymmetry in the German capital market.
Information asymmetry effects of IFRS adoption
As in the previous section, the following set of tests also uses the propensity score-matched sample developed in section 3. shows that share price volatility tends to be too high to be explained by firm fundamentals alone. Thus, if noise is one potential explanation for share price volatility, volatility can be expected to increase as information asymmetry increases.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
The explanatory variables in models (6) to (9) are as those used in Leuz/Verrecchia (2000) . They are aimed at capturing influential factors other than accounting standards followed. Their definitions are given in the notes to Table 5 . In line with Leuz/Verrecchia (2000, p. 110), we include BETA as an additional control in model (9) because we expect the volatility of a share to be influenced by its systematic risk.
Concerning our measure of bid-ask spread, we note that intraday bid-ask spreads are generally better suited than closing-price bid-ask spreads to capture the level of information asymmetry, especially since thin trading often occurs in the late trading hours. However, we use average closing price bid-ask spreads because we do not have access to a sufficiently large sample of intraday bid-ask spread data. The values of the dependent as well as independent variables are compared across the samples in Panel A and B of Table 5 .
Besides bid-ask-spread, all variables exhibit significant differences across the samples:
The shares of IFRS firms have more turnover, more frequent price changes, more volatile prices and carry more systematic risk than do the shares of comparable HGB firms.
The results of the models are presented in Panel C of Table 5 . The signs and magnitudes of the other explanatory variables are as theoretically predicted and generally significant. The estimation quality of the models is good, indicating a reasonable fit with the data. Turning to our main variable of interest, the dummy indicating IFRS adoption, we find that IFRS adoption seems to lead to lower bid-ask spreads, more frequent price changes and more volatility, while there is no significant impact on share turnover. The differences appear to be economically meaningful as well: They indicate a bid-ask spread reduction by 70 base points as well as increased liquidity reflected in 17 more trading days with price changes per year.
Again, these results crucially depend on the validity of model (1), which tries to capture the determinants of IFRS adoption. If we assume, in contrast to prior literature, that firms with higher levels of information asymmetry have an incentive not to adopt IFRS, possibly because the high levels of information asymmetry are the result of an opaque yet efficient corporate disclosure strategy not captured by the other determinants in model (1), this might be an alternative explanation for our findings in models (6) to (9). In addition, as index membership and IFRS adoption are closely related in our German sample, we cannot rule out index membership as an alternative explanation. In order to further test our results, we construct an alternative sample based on a pre and post analysis. The sample contains only firms which switch from HGB to IFRS and for which we have three years of prior and three years of subsequent data. This yields a small sample of 29 firms (172 observations). Comparing our measures of information asymmetry across time for these firms (not tabulated), we are able to replicate our findings for the frequency of price changes and volatility, but not for the bid-ask spread. However, pre and post research designs have fundamental problems, since it is nearly impossible to control for all changes occurring over time. Therefore, and due to the severely reduced sample size, we view the propensity score-matched results as our main results for our information asymmetry analysis. We conclude from this section that the supposedly higher quality of IFRS accounting has had a slight impact on the information asymmetry related to firms adopting IFRS, as we document a decline in the average bid-ask spread by 70 base points and 17 more price change days for these firms. However, this decrease in information asymmetry comes with a price tag: IFRS adopters also experience a significant increase in share price volatility.
Conclusion and future research opportunities in post-2005 Europe
We conclude from our study that the voluntary adoption of IFRS for German firms is influenced by size, international exposure, and dispersion of ownership. In addition, adopting IFRS was especially attractive for young firms which initially went public subsequent to the mid-1990s. Comparing a sub-sample of these voluntary IFRS adopters with comparable German-GAAP (HGB) firms, we find IFRS firms to have more persistent, less predictable and more conditionally conservative earnings. Taken together, we view these results as indicating that the earnings of IFRS firms are of higher quality. We also find that IFRS adopters experience lower levels of information asymmetry on the German equity market relative to their German counterparts: They experience a decline in bid-ask spread of 70 base points and an average of 17 more days with price changes.
On the other hand, more information also seems to induce more volatility: We find the level of share price volatility to be significantly higher for IFRS firms.
However, these results come with some important caveats: First, the concept of earnings quality does not capture accounting quality per se, let alone disclosure quality.
Given its theoretical underpinnings, it gives more weight to the decision-usefulness view of accounting than it does to the contracting view of accounting. Thus, concluding that IFRS earnings are of higher quality does not necessarily imply that they are a more effi-cient contracting device. Second, as every other correction scheme for selection bias we are aware of, our propensity score-matched research design presumes that the determinant model of IFRS adoption captures all relevant variables. If our determinant model suffers from omitted variables, these variables might present alternative explanations for our findings regarding earnings quality and information asymmetry. Third, our measures of earnings attributes and our proxies for information asymmetry are noisy and potentially biased. While noise reduces the power of our tests and thus works against finding significant differences, bias might render our results useless. Finally, even if our results are internally valid, their external validity might still be questioned: We investigate IFRS over a time period in which substantial changes concerning the contents of IFRS, the institutional infrastructure of IFRS standard setting, and the institutional infrastructure surrounding the German capital market and its participants occurred. All these changes might substantially limit the generalizability of our findings to other time periods and other institutional infrastructures.
Given the limitations of this study, the need for future research is obvious. In contrast to the time period studied in this paper, the post-IAS Regulation situation in Europe represents a nearly ideal setting for analyzing the relative roles of standards and institutional environments in determining financial reporting quality and other properties of financial reporting (Schipper, 2005; Nobes, 2005) . This new setting allows researchers to examine financial reports prepared under identical, high-quality standards by firms facing vastly different regulatory and firm-specific incentives. Therefore, besides the aspect of financial reporting quality, it also lends itself to assessing the extent to which the IAS Regulation was successful at bringing about greater comparability of financial reporting across Europe.
Not unlike previous research, the dimensions along which post-2005 European IFRS reports will need to be analyzed and compared internationally include accounting choice, compliance, financial reporting quality, and the impact of financial reporting on information asymmetry and on the cost of debt and equity capital. Any remaining international variation under harmonized IFRS reporting is likely to be driven by country-level differences in the degree of investor protection, securities regulation, legal system, financing system, corporate governance, auditing, and enforcement. Furthermore, firmlevel determinants including ownership structure, size, industry, investment opportunity set, and other incentives will also be influential factors.
However, while the new setting has obvious appeal, to the extent that mandatory IFRS reporting is shaped by the transitional choices of first-time adopters as well as by learning-curve effects of financial statement preparers and users, empirical findings in the initial years may be difficult to interpret and may not be representative of what IFRS reporting will some day look like. Also, the continuing evolution of IFRS (including their convergence with U.S. GAAP) and capital market regulation will inhibit the development of a stable European, let alone global, reporting environment in the foreseeable future.
While this may represent bad news to some constituents, it certainly is good news for researchers: The supply of captivating research questions is unlikely to decline soon. The sample comprises all firms included in the Worldscope universe. The data for "Accounting Standards Followed" is in large part hand-collected from annual reports. Where annual reports are unavailable, we use Worldscope item WC07536 (Accounting Standards Followed). Dual accounting is coded as HGB. Nonitalic numbers are frequency counts, and numbers in italics are percentages for the respective year. Notes: n represents the number of firm-year observations over 1998-2004. The sample is constructed by matching each IFRS observation with a HGB observation based on the propensities derived from the estimation of model (1). This procedure yields a sample of 1,140 observations. To ensure that only closely matched pairs are used in the analysis, a caliper of 0.1 is imposed, resulting in the smaller sample presented in the table. MKTCAP is the market capitalization of equity (WC08001) at the beginning of the fiscal year, measured in million €. NIBE_TA is net income before extraordinary items (WC01551) divided by total assets (WC02999). CFO_TA is CFO divided by total assets. CFO is net income before extraordinary items minus total accruals, which are equal to change in current assets (WC02201) less change in current liabilities (WC03101) less change in cash and cash equivalents (WC02001) plus change in current debt (WC03051) less depreciation, amortization and depletion (WC01151). RET is the buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. NEG is one if RET is below zero. The significance of sample differences is assessed by Chisquared tests for nominal variables and by t-tests (Wilcoxon tests) for the means (medians) of non-nominal variables. ***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
